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Abstract
The rise of wearable tech, namely devices with sensors measuring the 
user’s daily activities and habits seems to be suggesting a paradox 
in the post-Snowden era: On one hand, it is generally accepted that 
unauthorised use, storage and processing of the user’s private data 
by the state directly clashes with our fundamental rights for privacy; 
on the other, the user seems to be keen on self-recording and storing 
one’s own data by willingly using sensors, enabling him to learn 
more about one’s habits, general health status or even personality. 
In the era of wearable tech we seem to be accepting that measuring 
data is not a privacy infringement but a self-surveillance exercise in 
a quest to get to know ourselves better, most acute to exercising one’s 
right to free expression. Yet, how is this addressed in legal terms? 
The focal point for this paper is to address the nascent phenomenon 
of users actively partaking in the QS movement by wilfully sharing 
health related datasets. Part 1 notes the transition from the “right to 
be let alone” to the right to own one’s data as the underlying rational 
for QS: is it a form of expression regarding a tradable commodity in 
a free market or a matter of greater public importance? Part 2 dis-
sects the dilemma in sharing health data for public health and/or 
research purposes exceeding the strict limits of private sphere. The 
unfortunate case of Google Health, the unconstitutional purchase 
of Iceland’s national datasets by deCODE and the mishap of the 
Care.data are studied to shed light to the many faces of our Quan-
tified Selves: Is the current legislative approach fit for facilitating 
the QS movement, as a type of self-expression? The paper critically 
examines self-measurement technologies from a legal perspective 
and calls for urgent reforms in self-measured data protection. 
My Quantified Self, my FitBit and I:  
Performing Self-Surveillance Exercises in the Post-Snowden Era
The rise of wearable tech, namely devices with sensors measuring the user’s 
daily activities and habits seems to be suggesting a paradox in the post-Snowden 
era: On the one hand, it is generally accepted that unauthorised use, storage 
and processing of the user’s private data by the state directly clashes with our 
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fundamental rights for privacy; on the other, the user seems to be keen on 
self-recording and storing one’s own data by willingly using sensors, enabling 
oneself to learn more about general habits, health status or one’s own person-
ality. In this sense, it has been suggested that privacy has gradually changed its 
meaning: in the era of wearable tech we seem to be accepting that measuring 
data is not a privacy infringement but a self-surveillance exercise, most acute to 
exercising one’s right to freely express oneself. As a result, wearable technology 
seems to be holding great potential for moving us from the concept of “online 
surveillance” towards the concept of “sousveillance” (Kurzweil et al. 2013), namely 
inverse community-based surveillance instead of a state organised act for the 
public good. In 2003, Mann, Nolan and Wellman published a pioneering study 
(Mann et al. 2003), whereby it was demonstrated that wearable tech can aid user 
empowerment and suggest alternative ways of surveillance. Almost twelve years 
later, it seems that the user is mostly treated as a mere consumer, wanting not 
to express oneself through the use of wearable tech but simply to get to know 
himself better (Rettberger 2014).
The focal point of this paper is to establish a broader understanding of the 
legal right to privacy, identify links and overlapping areas with other funda-
mental human rights, such as free speech, and explore these within the scope of 
autonomy-based legal theories. Premised on the hypothesis that privacy in the 
digital era has a wider reach than a mere entitlement to non-disclosure or iden-
tification, the main aim of the paper is to highlight the limited understanding 
of this right and further demonstrate how this can be problematic, once applied 
in health-related data. It is therefore intended to critically study here an often 
overlooked issue: the many faces data can have and how this tends to challenge 
conventional legal thinking regarding data sharing. To this cause, health-related 
data furnishes us with a great study case: The polymorphic concept of health 
data is used in this paper to validate the hypothesis that the legal understanding 
of privacy is limited and ought to be revised in the digital era. To demonstrate 
this, the Quantified Self (QS) movement shall serve as a point of departure. 
Not only is self-monitoring a perfect manifestation of privacy as a right encom-
passing self-determination but exploring in depth how wearable tech is utilised 
to monitor one’s own data shall further help our understanding of a nascent 
field of research, which presents a major legal challenge, due to its direct link 
to health-related data: data sharing. The policy maker is asked to perform a 
balancing act between privacy stricto sensu, and free expression; a redefined 
legislative framework for regulating health-related data is therefore essential for 
knowing where to draw the line. Before however this intricate balance is further 
looked into, it is essential that self-tracking is first explained.
The growing tendency to self-track and quantify has taken off since its start 
in 2008 when two former Wired magazine editors, Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly, 
co-founded the “Quantified Self” digital tracking group. The term is now used 
to describe the mainstream phenomenon of people collecting data as means of 
recording and analysing their lifestyle (Haddadi/Brown 2014). It is estimated 
that 60 % of US adults are currently tracking their weight, diet and exercise 
routine (Swan 2013), actively collecting and analysing their data in the context 
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of their individual experiences (Nafus/Sherman 2014). The QS movement 
has further led on to some revolutionary ways of peer interaction regarding 
commonly faced health problems: self-measured data can gain added value and 
potentially provide answers, once joined in larger datasets with similar pools of 
data. Unlike data mining, data sharing has always been considered as an activity 
that has the potential to give back to the community. The 2016 Pew Research 
Center study on privacy and information sharing (Rainie/Page 2016) found 
that there are a variety of circumstances under which many people would share 
personal information or permit surveillance in return for getting something 
of perceived value. With regard to health related information, data sharing can 
further promote a major public health goal: preventive medicine. As Swan notes 
“the individual, now through quantified self-tracking and other low-cost newly-
available tools, has the ability to understand his or her own patterns and baseline 
measures, and obtain early warnings as to when there is variance and what to 
do about this” (Swan 2012: 95). This further translated into a new concept of 
citizenship: “bio-citizenship”, namely people using their self-measured data to 
promote science and aid predictive medicine, often to the detriment of their 
own privacy.
The fact that users willingly buy and use wearable tech to monitor their 
daily activities and overall performance, mood and/or health does not implic-
itly amount to complete consent to their loss of privacy. They do however often 
engage in data sharing for reasons of treatment personalisation and crowd-
sourcing medicine solutions to common health issues. According to a 2015 
study by the University of Southern California’s Annenberg Center for the 
Digital Future and Bovitz Inc. (2015) online privacy and data sharing is an issue 
of trust for users older than 35, whereas it appears to be a purely opportunistic 
matter of an informed trade-off for younger users, at an age between 17 and 35. 
For the latter it is a form of expression regarding a tradable commodity in a free 
market of online services, for the former data sharing concerns the traditional 
concept of privacy, namely the right to decide whether to reveal or not personal 
information to the public sphere. 
This suggests clearly that the concept of privacy seems to have changed in 
the era of wearable tech, its focus shifted from the right to be left alone (Warren/
Brandeis 1890) to a right to “own” one’s data, either for its value determining a 
fair trade-off or for its fundamental nature as a human right, enshrined in the 
constitution. Alex Pentland’s “New Deal on Data” (Pentland 2013: 83; Pentland 
2011) describes data as an asset that can be “possessed, owned and disposed of” 
(2011) – this description, reflects the current trend of enabling the user to be in 
control of his data transactions. Is then data sharing a mere transactional act, 
perhaps ruled by contractual obligations delineating a tradable commodity or 
is this strictly a matter of privacy law? Most importantly, each time the user 
willingly performs a self-surveillance exercise the legal boundaries between 
free expression and privacy appear somewhat blurred. Would this then seem to 
be paradoxically suggesting that users are willing to entrust private entities with 
their data as long as they are free to decide themselves how to trade? And how 
would this explain the public outcry after the Snowden revelations? 
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In the remainder of the paper it is suggested that the truth is neither here, 
nor there. It would be a fallacy, an oversimplified claim to argue that the use of 
wearable tech amounts to the user’s admittance that his privacy rights no longer 
exist. What is argued instead is that we seem to be moving towards a greater 
autonomy-based concept of privacy. This explains well why self-surveillance 
also implies an act of self-expression. This further explains the consideration 
of ownership rights over one’s data (Purtova 2011). The next section provides 
an account of data sharing as both an act of self-expression with a high social 
value as well as a transaction involving tradable commodities. It will be shown 
that – although frequently literature and jurisprudence has discussed data from 
a privacy angle  – personal health data sharing is often dealt with as a legal 
paradox. From there on the paper urges for a legal framework supporting the 
safe and secure dissemination of health related data. The next section seeks 
to elaborate further how personal data entails certain levels of autonomy; a 
rationale, which underpins both privacy and free expression. It should therefore 
be noted that user-generated and self-measured data is somewhat broader than 
a mere right to non-disclosure of personal information and ought to be under-
stood as a clear manifestation of self-determination.
Data as a Manifestation of Autonomy  
beyond the Realms of Privacy 
Following conventional methodology, it would appropriate at this stage to provide 
a definition of privacy; yet, there is no common consensus among legal scholars 
as to what this human right might entail (Parker 1973: 275). As Post notes: 
“Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory 
dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes 
despair, whether it can be usefully addressed at all.” (2001: 2087). Although 
privacy is indeed an elusive concept to properly define, it is safe to say that the 
main concern from a legal point of you is to provide regulative principles for 
managing the status of one’s identity within the overlapping spheres of society, 
market and the state (cf. Kahn 2003: 372). This understanding of privacy as an 
entitlement to one’s personhood can serve as a point of reference but would still 
not suffice to provide an accurate definition, especially once privacy is consid-
ered within the conceptual scope of another ubiquitous and hardly defined area: 
big data. The latter, not being touched upon by legal scholars until recently, 
intensifies the problem of adequately defining privacy in the era of big data (cf. 
Ward/Barker 2013). The most significant part of the debate though is that data 
can translate to anything from a legal point of view: information, once seen 
as data can relate to different rights, not necessarily privacy. What is striking 
though, is the fact that the principle of autonomy seems to be the underpinning 
rationale in all these cases. This observation is the argumentative basis for this 
paper. But before this is further expanded upon with regard to health related 
data sharing and the QS movement, let’s take a closer look at this intricate inter-
section of privacy and free speech as different sides of the same coin: autonomy.
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Free speech theorists have long argued that speech should not be merely 
considered as a means towards societal progress and collective well-being; it 
constitutes an intrinsic value indispensable to the individual alone (Rosenfeld 
2002: 1535), being an integral part of self-fulfilment and self-realisation of the 
individual’s free potential (Schauer 1982: 49). Applied in the context of big data 
and wearable tech, these theories document well how the major issue at stake is 
not the traditional concept of privacy but the wider concept of autonomy, further 
reflecting on the user’s ability to develop and exercise one’s own rationality as to 
how and when to share one’s data. 
The common ground between the right to free speech and privacy with 
regard to online data is not identified here for the first time. Jane Bambauer 
(2014) suggests that, inasmuch data privacy laws control communicatory intel-
lectual interactions among users; data in this context could be treated as speech. 
This however perplexes matters further when it comes to wearable computing 
and the QS movement. While users have the ability to monitor themselves and 
build databases of their daily activities, such data is centrally stored beyond 
the user’s control over data. Should this be regarded speech, then this would 
effectively grant First Amendment protection to data-brokers and various info-
mediaries1, data mining and processing would thus be regarded as expressive 
conduct to the detriment of the user’s autonomy. This scenario would most 
certainly raise a major constitutional issue, reaching beyond the scope of private 
sphere, currently reflected in the data protection regime in the EU and the US. 
Further to this, Seth Kreimer accepts that there seems to be a major overlap 
between privacy and free speech in data in the sense that whilst data processing 
can be protected under the First Amendment, there is not always a counter-
vailing privacy interest (Kreimer 2011: 335-409) to limit data processing, mining 
or storage. This last point highlights well the many faces of personal data, espe-
cially when it is health-related: a commodity, which can be very profitable to a 
handful of players trading datasets, as well as an asset of high societal value. 
Alan Westin’s work has been influential in linking privacy and autonomy 
by defining the latter as a right of the individual to define herself for others; 
privacy in his view, is not merely a matter of disclosure of personal data beyond 
the private sphere but rather one’s right to “information self-determination” 
(Westin 1967). Westin articulates privacy as the “claim of individuals, groups or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent infor-
mation about them is communicated to others” (ibid: 7). This view maintains 
a broader scope to a mere right to control one’s data: it suggests the ability to 
self-definition. The latter (right to self-definition) fits comfortably with what has 
already been discussed thus far with regard to the use of wearable tech and big 
data, the former (right to control) falls short and cannot be properly applied 
in an online context (Schwartz 1999: 1609-1701; Schwartz/Reidenberg 1996). 
1 See for example Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., No. 10-779 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011), where 
the Supreme Court ruled that data mining and pharmaceutical companies exer-
cise their right to free speech under the First Amendment in mining data from 
clinicians’ prescriptions.
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The autonomy-based rationale for private data constitutes a paradigmatic shift 
from the right to be “let alone” (Warren and Brandeis 1890) to a “right to be 
let to decide alone” how you wish to be defined as an individual. In the context 
of wearable tech, it becomes apparent that regulation of aggregated data does 
not balance free speech against privacy but rather aims at defining how liberty-
based fundamental rights are to be weighed against the free flow of information 
for the public (cf. Reidenberg 1999: 1341-1342). In this view, autonomy can be 
exercised when an individual is presented with choices and makes an informed 
decision; a concept unfortunately not evident in contemporary data protection 
regime.
For the time being however, the lawmaker – mostly at a European level – 
seems to ignore the autonomy argument as a principle underpinning data 
sharing. The closest legal criterion still in use is consent – this however appears 
to be narrower than autonomy: A consent-oriented privacy regime unavoidably 
focuses on the user as a merely passive data subject and not as an active listener/
speaker, whose autonomy needs to be guaranteed as a precondition for making 
informed choices over one’s data. The absence of a robust legal framework able 
to fully protect QS and data sharing has led to a general feeling of fear and 
mistrust towards processing and storing user-generated health data. The next 
section examines three cases of health data processing, whereby it is clearly 
shown that the law is still lagging behind and does not fully perceive nor protect 
data as an expression of autonomy but regards it a mere tradable commodity.
Trust by Choice: Towards Voluntary Data Heavens
It has so far been contended that privacy seems to have gained a new meaning in 
the context of the QS movement: the rationale is no longer to keep information 
secret but to keep a daily log of one’s biometric data with a view to learn more 
about oneself. At the same time, the emergence of various QS communities 
eager to share and exchange health data for research purposes, adds another 
dimension to the issue at hand: when shared, data gains added societal value. 
This, however, does not suggest that data cannot be monetised or be a valuable 
asset at the same time: the larger the dataset, the more valuable data becomes. 
At the moment there is a booming industry dealing with storage, processing 
and mining of health data. Being both a profitable business and a valuable asset 
for research, health data poses an interesting dilemma: if shared, it is no longer 
under the user’s control; if it remains hidden, research misses out an unprec-
edented opportunity to significantly contribute to science. 
What is suggested here is that data protection should view biometric data 
within a wider scope of autonomy with a view to maintain the user’s autonomy in 
the era of big data. One of the most significant consequences of the NSA revela-
tions are that the user’s trust in the way online communications are handled by 
the state and the private industry was shaken. The issue of re-establishing trust 
has been dominating policy making fora ever since: In January 2016, the report 
entitled “Big Data: A European Survey on Opportunities and Risks on Data 
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Analytics”, commissioned by Vodafone’s Institute for Society and Communica-
tions (2016), revealed a great gap in trust on how data is being handled online. 
Under a third of the 8.000 respondents that took part in the survey appear to be 
convinced that their personal data is being handled in a trustworthy manner: 
18 per cent confirmed their trust in telecommunications providers handling 
data, whereas 43 per cent trust healthcare institutions, 36 per cent trust their 
employers and 33 per cent trust banks. Trust becomes a delicate matter, espe-
cially once health data in particular enters the discussion of big data: the inef-
ficiency of a robust mechanism of protection of such sensitive data plays a key 
part in the user’s absence of trust. The 2015 BMC Medicine report by Wicks 
and Chiauzzi confirmed this further. Their review of the accredited National 
Health Service Health Apps Library found “poor and inconsistent implementa-
tion of privacy and security, with 28 per cent of apps lacking a privacy policy and 
one even transmitting personally identifying data the policy claimed would be 
anonymous” (2015: 205). 
The current legal concept of privacy appears to be fairly limited in dealing 
with this challenge: Health data analytics can be a double edged sword, having 
a great potential promote science while at the same time posing a great risk 
to one’s privacy. Drawing the right balance between privacy and scientific 
progress could be a valuable tool towards rebuilding the user’s trust as to how 
his personal data is dealt with online. At the same time, it can hardly be argued 
that reinstating trust in health data analytics is a task exclusively reserved for 
either the state or the private sector: both seem to have failed regaining the 
user’s trust online due to the limitations imposed on the user’s autonomy. The 
unfortunate cases of GoogleHealth, Care.data and deCODE’s Health Sector 
Database explored below demonstrate well this point. 
Google Health’s Unfortunate End: Trust-Building Exercises
In 2008, Google attempted to reach a critical mass of users and interested third 
parties and offered them the opportunity to self-manage their health informa-
tion through a summary records platform. After four years of perseverance, 
the platform was eventually deserted exposing the public’s ignorance and lack 
of interest (cf. Greenhalgh et al. 2010). The official reasons of Google Health 
failures have never been released and discontinuation in 2011 has since been 
justified by the lack of participation from its consumers and collaborators2. That 
said, the rejection of Google Health platform signifies that the lack of robust 
governance and legislative provisions in place to monitor the access and sharing 
of sensitive data that fuel the anxieties and evidently led to the reluctance in 
embracing Google Health. A username and password would activate an indi-
vidual account where participants could enter their health conditions, medi-
cations, allergies and lab results and build a personal health records profile. 
2 “An update on Google Health and Google PowerMeter”, June 24, 2011 (https://
googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2011/06/update-on-google-health-and-google.html).
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Medical records and prescriptions from any of Google’s partner hospitals and 
pharmacies could be imported- however, this potentially highlighted another 
flaw as there were not enough collaborators within the network embracing the 
platform.
Predominantly, it became clear individuals felt, and arguably still feel, 
uncomfortable with the idea of a multinational commercial entity accessing 
personal health records (cf. Spil/Klein 2014). Principally, Google’s privacy 
policy, “We believe that your health information belongs to you, and you should 
decide how much you share and whom you share it with […]. We store your 
information securely and privately”3 did not offer proportionate procedural safe-
guards to reassure its users in failing to detail what they meant by ‘securely’ 
and ‘privately.’ Users were given the option to share their health records with 
third parties friends, family and doctors with the safeguard that they could 
always see who had access of their information and permission can be revoked 
at any time. However, the crux was that once permission was revoked it was 
implausible to monitor and control who had access to the records as Google 
could not account for any copies made by third parties who were not governed by 
privacy regulations during the time permission was valid and the websites that 
had been linked to a personal health records. Therefore, Google claimed not to 
assume liability for the information. Competitors such as Microsoft HealthVault 
made bold gestures in joining the Coalition for Patient Privacy4, committing 
to the seventeen principles for privacy; whereas Google failed to offer the same 
level of reassurance and relied solely on their website announcements. Further 
scrutiny of the fine print revealed Google may share the data patients store on 
Google Health for the purposes of enabling additional features for other Google 
products (Tanne 2008: 1207-1211). The general consensus was that the benefit to 
Google Health outweighed any personal benefit the individuals would receive 
from sharing their data and the lack of trust between the commercial entity and 
the public inevitably contributed to its downfall. 
Ironically, the Google Inc. offering, which on the surface had the advantage 
of delivering the scalability required, in reality served as a double edged sword 
as Google did not only fail to achieve the visibility for the platform to gather a 
substantial following needed to make the project a success; but with a profit 
making agenda it aroused concerns around the rigidity of the contemporary 
data protection safeguards in place. The strength of the safeguards that sought 
to protect the privacy of its consumers in the face of challenge were questioned. 
Ultimately, there was a lack of confidence in the intentions of Google and 
suspicion surrounding the possible intentions behind gathering vast amount of 
health data, stored in central databases.
3 http://hexus.net/ce/news/general/13383-google-health-launches-plans-manage-
well-being/. 
4 “Coalition for Patient Privacy”, June 13, 2015 (https://patientprivacyrights.org/coa 
lition-patient-privacy/).
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It is clear Google has not admitted defeat due to the announcement of 2015, 
introducing Google X5, the company’s plans for developing a new wearable 
wristband able to detect, monitor and store data such as pulse, heart rhythm 
and skin temperature. However, the approach is now different: the company 
will be seeking regulatory approval for its use in medical contexts, i. e. as a 
medical device prescribed to patients are used in clinical trials. In other words, 
the business model seems to be moving from mere collection of data in a central 
database to a peer-to-peer (patient to doctor) architecture, whereby data is treated 
as a valuable asset that can be freely exchanged to serve scientific research as well 
as the patients themselves. This venture is added to a long list of similar initia-
tives: Apple’s Research Kit6, allowing the use of iPhones as medical diagnostic 
devices by the user without the company’s direct involvement is another such 
example. All these business initiatives, share a very similar pattern: instead of 
merely performing data mining exercises (often without the user’s knowledge 
or consent), they are mostly interested in enabling user empowerment to share 
one’s data in a decentralized manner. In doing so encouraging users to partici-
pate would only improve the quality and quantity of data and if willingly shared, 
reduce the red tape on the use. 
The implications for the trust relationship between these corporations 
and individuals have somewhat become obscure and almost ignored. It seems 
corporations such as Google are attempting to bypass the hurdle of establishing 
trust with their users organically and the rationale now to further their means 
seems to utilize the patient and doctor relationship. Mostly, whether the more 
user activity enhances the transparency of its use is yet to be identified. 
Care.data: A National Failure to Build a Database
Contrary to Google Health, Care.data was a state run project that had no involve-
ment of private actors. In a highly data driven society, the debacle of Care.data 
in the UK, examined whether it is possible to strike the right balance between 
encouragement of the biotechnology industry and protection of the genetic 
history of citizens (Rodriguez et al. 2013: 276). Once again, public concern 
regarding medical data privacy halted the plans of the National Health Service 
in the UK to create a centralized health-care database. The legal framework in 
place offered little guarantees for the data subject’s autonomy: the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012 enabled the creation of a central database amassing all 
clinicians’ records, while third party usage was justified under the pretext of 
5 “Google’s new wearable tracks vital signs for medicine”, June 23, 2015 (http://
www.techradar.com/news/wearables/google-s-new-wear able-tracks-vital-signs-
for-medi cine-1297586).
6 “Apple ResearchKit Turns iPhones Into Medical Diagnostic Devices”, March 9, 
2015 (http://techcrunch.com/2015/03/09/apple-introduces-researchkit-turning-iph 
on es-into-medi cal-diagnostic-devices).
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pseudonymised HSCIC7 datasets. This clearly undermined the right of indi-
viduals to make their own informed decisions on healthcare matters.
Moreover, the clinician’s lack of clarity and understanding on the legal 
standards of protection (McGraw 2013: 34) could pose significant privacy threats: 
in the absence of ample restrictions, other commercial organisations outside the 
pharmaceutical industry could have unethically and unlawfully accessed the 
database8. Despite the fact that the opt-out policy was later reversed by the NHS, 
the failures of this project were reflected in the mere 29 % of adult population 
recalling the leaflet9 and only a total 19 % supporting it10. The fears amongst 
scholars that the lack of commitment the government has shown on protec-
tion of rights in the Care.data project may compromise public trust in research 
remain very much valid. At the time of the writing, extraction of data is taking 
place in the UK while the UK’s national data guardian Fiona Caldicott has been 
entrusted with the task to evaluate the fair processing testing communica-
tions. In the meanwhile, Care.data is currently being redesigned, along with 
a number of additional digital services that the NHS is building, following a 
“crowd coursed” model of online patient care. Note for example, the Friends and 
Family Test (FFT), a dataset of people’s comments and ratings of local hospitals11.
The 2014 Royal Statistical Society “Data Manifesto” puts particular stress 
on the importance of data sharing encouraging the free and open access of 
the citizens to national datasets. In dissecting the Care.data debacle the three 
core issues that were posed began with the extraction of personal confidential 
data: the processing of the personal confidential data and finally the onward of 
disclosure of data. When the opt-in selection has been made, the consent hurdle 
immediately is forgone. In contrast; the doctrine of autonomy is impacted when 
the individuals are deprived of further regulating any third parties utilizing 
their personal data in any which way. As previously noted in the Google Health 
case, the absence of transparency, guidelines and best practises for clinicians 
and provisions for health related data exchange, are once again a great hindrance 
to data sharing. It becomes apparent the more confined the control an individual 
has over the sharing and use of their healthcare data; the greater the hindrance 
to their autonomy. However, as it will be shown in the next case study, restoring 
trust is not merely an issue of being able to build a database relying on a robust 
infrastructure.
7 Health and Social Care Information Center.
8 For example, GE Data Visualization uses information based on 7.2 million patient 
records from GE’s proprietary database, 2011 (http://senseable.mit.edu/healthin 
foscape/); Cf. http://www3.gehealthcare.co.uk/.
9 “Adults Unaware of NHS Data Plans”, February 14, 2014 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/health-26187980). 
10 “Three in Four GPs Believe Care.data Should be ‘Opt In’”, February 26, 2014 
(http://www.pulsetoday.co.uk/your-practice/practice-topics/it/three-in-four-gps-
believe-caredata-should-be-opt-in/20005954.article). 
11 For more details see http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/AboutNHSservices/Pages/
nhs-friends-and-family-test.aspx.
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DeCODE Disaster: Demystifying the De-Identification Myth
Iceland has been described as “the world’s greatest genetic laboratory”12: the 
homogeneity of its population means less genetic variation, which offers an 
ideal environment for geneticists wishing to conduct medical research based 
on genome sequencing. Decode Genetics Inc., a for-profit American corpora-
tion, published in 2015 four papers in Nature Genetics13, whereby the findings 
of sequencing genomes of 2,636 Icelanders (almost 1  % of the total population) 
were presented. In doing so, the company built one of the most impressive and 
valuable datasets of genomes, able to contribute significantly towards identi-
fying the genetics of common diseases.
DeCODE’s efforts however have been met with lot of scepticism and the 
way to building their database has not been paved with gold: the company, rose 
from its ashes in 2012, after it had to file for bankruptcy in 2009 due to its 
questionable business practises and commercial exploitation of the data mined. 
The initial plan of the company to raise funds from the public by selling shares 
to their central database containing health information fell apart, when the law 
allowing for the creation of their database was found unconstitutional. The 
company was never able to build the database promised for and did not deliver 
their public offering.
In order to construct its database, deCODE proposed to collect data from 
medical records via publicly accessible genealogies, hospitals and health 
centres and finally from research for which a form of consent was required 
to be compiled into a Health Sector Database14 The Act on a Health Sector 
Database (No. 139/1998) was passed by the Icelandic Parliament on December 
17th, 1998, after extensive debates in the Parliament and the society at large. 
The Bill was heavily criticized on numerous counts, including that it lacked 
provisions for obtaining informed consent of individuals whose information 
was included in the database, undermined scientific freedom, restrained 
competition, eroded the doctor-patient confidential relationship, and invaded 
individuals’ right to privacy (Adalsteinsson 2003: 203; Andor 2003: 204). Soon 
afterwards, DeCODE went into an agreement with the Icelandic State to pay an 
annual fee in return for being granted a 12 year exclusive license for operating 
the HSD.
In 2003, the Iceland Supreme Court’s Gubmundsdottir v. Iceland,15 held the 
compilation of personal health records and available genetic information in one 
electronic database unconstitutional, unless each individual specifically indicated 
12 “Why Iceland Is the World’s Greatest Genetic Laboratory”, March 25, 2015 (http://
www.wired.com/2015/03/iceland-worlds-greatest-genetic-laboratory/).
13 “deCODE Publishes Largest Human Genome Population Study”, March 25, 2015 
(http://www.bio-itworld.com/2015/3/25/decode-publishes-largest-human-gen 
ome-population-study.html).
14 From this point on referred to as HSD. 
15 No. 151/2003, Part IV.
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otherwise in a pre-defined six-month window unlawful.16 The database was to 
include information on children, deceased persons, and incompetent individ-
uals, all of whom are unable to legally provide informed consent to the use of 
their personal information. The Icelandic Supreme Court17 held that the HSD 
Bill did not grant a proportionately adequate protection to the information it was 
set to contain as demanded by the sensitivity of the information.
The fact that genetic information may reveal medical information not 
only pertaining to the subject herself but also to relatives was used to argue 
that genetic information is different and more intrusive than other forms of 
traditional medical information. In its analysis of the HSD Act, the Icelandic 
Supreme Court found additional flaws with the Act’s protection mechanisms of 
personal privacy; concluding that the one-way coding mechanism established 
by the HSD Act is insufficient for protecting individuals’ privacy. The Supreme 
Court’s reasoning was two-fold: first, the Act provided no specific guidance as 
to what type of information must be encrypted in this manner; and second, 
the Court interpreted the license to imply that after the deletion of an indi-
viduals’ name and address only personal identification number needed to be 
encrypted. In effect, although records were be ‘de-identified’ by removing the 
name and address and replacing with encrypting the social security number, 
the encryption done outside control of Roche, they would be linked to genetic, 
family data. As a result identification would be very easy, given that Iceland 
would provide a tight context for the data under review- Iceland easy to identify. 
The Act presumed the consent of patients to release their records to deCODE. 
Individuals thus must affirmatively opt out in order to prevent their data from 
being recorded in the health sector database18 (cf. Árnason 2007).
Predominately, deCODE aspired to rely on theoretical protection of de-iden-
tification to reap the benefits of analytics, meanwhile avoiding denunciation for 
breaching individual privacy. The “silver bullet,” (Tene/Polonetsky 2012: 257) of 
pseudonymisation, anonymisation, encryption and various forms of key-coding 
was relied on by deCODE to distance data from personal identities in order 
to justify the secondary uses of personal data. There seems to be a presump-
tion that de-identification and anonymisation renders identification impossible 
(Ohm 2010: 270). However, it needs to be reiterated that it takes only 33 bits of 
information to identify a human19. The practical problems of medical data allows 
for linking episodes into longitudinal records, most patients can be re-identified 
through the ‘Incremental Effect’ (Narayanan/Shmatikov 2008: 119), where any 
16 The HSD Act provided a six-month grace period beginning with the passage of the 
Act, in which people could choose to opt-out of the project. HSD Act, supra note 11, 
art. 8. See also infra section IV.A.3.
17 ibid. 5
18 Cf. “Iceland’s Research Resources: The Health Sector Database, Genealogy Data-
bases, and Biobanks”, NIH Paper, June 1, 2014 (http://grants.nih.gov/grants/ice-
landic_research.pdf).
19 Cf. “The End of Anonymous Data and What to Do about It”, 33 Bits of Entropy, 
February 5, 2016 (http://33bits.org/about/).
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piece of data that has been linked to a person’s real identity breaks anonymity 
and is irreversible. However, New Zealand, demonstrates such a database can 
effectively exist only when a small number of health service statisticians are 
permitted to access limited enquiry results of up to six patients at a time in the 
National Medical Data Set (Neame 1997: 225). The encrypted social security 
numbers are not considered alone an adequate inference security; (Anderson 
1998: 4; Denning 1983; Information/Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada, 
and Registratiekammer: 1995) special administrative measures are appointed 
through regulation and data protection legislation with independent govern-
ment agencies for protection. 
It was not until several years later, in 2015, that deCODE (whole owned 
and operated by Amgen) managed to accumulate genetic data of almost half of 
the Icelandic population and thus be able to identify people at risk of potential 
developing a genetic disease. Having failed at receiving legal approval to mine 
data without consent, deCODE built a research database using clinical data of a 
large sample of volunteers. If there are any lessons to be learned from deCODE’s 
mishaps is that open data  – when addressed as from the perspective of the 
user and not merely mined and stored into a centralised database – can be of 
particular significance for advancing scientific research. De-anonymisation and 
consent have been proven to be the first point of action when lawmakers are 
faced with health related data mining; yet, how effective are they for protecting 
the data subject’s privacy? Most importantly: at what cost? It is therefore impera-
tive that we further consider the impediment to scientific progress, especially 
when voluntary schemes of open data exchange can pave the way towards a new 
system of collecting health related data for national databases.
The next section dissects the issue of monetisation of personal data and 
seeks to explain how a narrow concept of privacy will not only restore the user’s 
trust but can further pose a significant threat to the QS movement and open data. 
Sharing is Caring?  
The Monetisation of Health Data and the Sharer’s Dilemma
The unfortunate cases of online data repositories discussed, highlight that 
health related data, once perceived as a tradable commodity, poses a significant 
challenge for privacy scholars: it is no longer one’s privacy that is at stake but 
the user’s ability to determine the flow of his personal data. As noted above, 
autonomy has been identified by legal scholars as one of the underpinning 
rationales for privacy as well as free speech. It can further be argued that not 
allowing the user to maintain a certain level of “informational autonomy”, 
namely the ability to control one’s personal data flow, can be detrimental to his 
privacy and undermine any benefits that health data analytics might have.20 The 
20 “Privacy and data protection laws are premised on individual control over informa-
tion and on principles such as data minimization and purpose limitation. Yet it 
is not clear that minimizing information collection is always a practical approach 
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QS movement are a clear manifestation of how the user’s autonomy ought to be 
the basis of a robust data protection legislative framework.
In the early days of wearable tech, user empowerment was the main 
objective for building an interconnected environment of things and sensors, 
able to facilitate the needs of the consumer in an automated manner. In 
1998 Mann observed: “The most fundamental issue in WearComp [wearable 
computing] is no doubt that of personal empowerment through its ability to 
equip the individual with a personalised, customisable operation space owned, 
operated and controlled by the wearer” (Mann 1998: 2128). Since then, wearable 
technology has proven to be a profitable business, an industry expected to reach 
$ 11.61 billion in revenues by the end of 2020 (Markets and Markets Report 2015). 
As a result, data is not simply a private or public matter but also a commercial 
product; a tradable commodity that is part of the daily transactions of several 
info-mediaries and data-brokers. The recent FTC21 report from May 2014 “Data 
Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability” urges the Congress to 
enhance transparency and user’s control over their data (FTC 2014)22. That said, 
instead of user empowerment, the current legislative framework appears to 
disregard the concept of autonomy. On the other side of the Atlantic, a series 
of recently leaked proposals (February 2015) for data protection implementa-
tion, show that Member States are determined to carve out major guarantees for 
online privacy offered in the European Commission’s proposal for the purposes 
of an “overriding public interest” (recital 30) or for “scientific purposes”. In fact, 
the leaked documents go as far as re-introducing profiling (originally deleted 
after the European Parliament’s approved text of the proposal in 2014) as an 
accepted limitation to privacy on grounds of national security, defence, public 
security and even “other important objectives of general public interest”23. This 
can be an alarming prospect once examined within the context of wearable tech: 
as noted in the 2015 Nuffield Council on Bioethics report “the bulwarks that have 
hitherto protected a satisfactory and workable accommodation of interests, prin-
cipally, the de-identification of data and the ‘informed’ consent of data ‘subjects’, 
have been substantially weakened in a hyper-connected (or potentially hyper-
connectable) ‘big data’ world” (Report of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2015).
to privacy in the age of big data. The principles of privacy and data protection 
must be balanced against additional societal values such as public health, national 
security and law enforcement, environmental protection, and economic efficiency. 
A coherent framework would be based on a risk matrix, taking into account the 
value of different uses of data against the potential risks to individual autonomy 
and privacy.” (Tene/Polonetsky 2012: 67)
21 Federal Trade Commission, hereafter referred to as FTC.




23 For a detailed analysis on the leaked documents see EDRi/Access/Panoptykon/
Foundation/Privacy International (2015).
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The importance of this in the case of wearable tech and QS is evident once 
we consider the merits of open data for epidemiology (cf. Barrett et al. 2013): 
open data in the public domain seems to be gaining some ground in the US and 
the UK (Business, Innovation and Skills Committee 3rd special report 2013). 
At the same time though, centralisation is identified as the main obstacle for 
protecting the user’s privacy, carrying the danger of data abuses. This is clearly 
evidenced in the 2015 Nuffield Report, which states: 
“Whereas standardisation is desirable and technical interoperability essential for linking 
separately collected and maintained datasets, the drive towards exploitation of public 
data in the UK has, additionally, involved the consolidation and centralisation of some 
data resources in so-called ‘safe havens’ for health and public sector data. […] Although 
centralisation is convenient for the extraction of value through the application of data 
analysis, consolidated databases create large targets for unauthorised technical access, 
unauthorised access by insiders, or abuse of authorised access at the behest of powerful 
lobbyists” (Report of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2015).
The Road Ahead: Quantified Selves and Data Protection Policies
The QS movement and the numerous cases of users wilfully sharing data 
amongst various online fora, show that data sharing is clearly an act of self-
expression, which is in need of robust legal protection: de-anonymisation and 
consent do not help the users to regain trust but appear to be limited measures 
offering little protection to open data initiatives.
Unfortunately, the current data protection regime appears to be fragmented 
and distanced from the notion of autonomy. On one hand the US approach 
to privacy has been market dominated, reflecting a policy oriented towards 
treating privacy under consumer rights (Reidenberg 1999). On the other, EU 
policy for data protection, although reflecting at large a rights-based approach, 
seems most preoccupied with the enforcement of its regulation in the cloud 
for strengthening national commercial interests and less concerned with main-
taining the user’s autonomy as such. According to the Data Protection Directive, 
a company may process private information on the basis of consent of the user 
(data subject). Article 29 Working Party has further described that consent is 
required to be freely given, implicitly and most importantly informed (Opinion 
15/2011 on the Definition of Consent 2011: WP187). An informed consent although 
by definition presupposes a certain level of autonomy to reach a decision, is not 
easy to grant or legally assess when discussing the use of ubiquitous technolo-
gies. In its 2014 report the Working Party has expressed concerns over the prob-
lematic applicability of consent within the remit of wearable tech: The fact that 
an automated system prioritises the ease of a seamless system over constantly 
informing the user about how his data is collected and processed can further 
pose a significant barrier to demonstrating valid consent under EU law, as the 
data subject must be informed” (Opinion 8/2014 on the Recent Developments 
on the Internet of Things 2014: WP223). Is this a structural deficiency of the 
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networked environment or an unprecedented legal challenge? It seems that the 
truth is neither here nor there: the rapid centralisation of datasets, evident in the 
case studies mentioned above, when combined with a limited range of choices 
for the user to control processing of his data lies at the heart of the problem. 
This paper has sought to explain how boosting the user’s autonomy should 
be the focal point of data protection. The QS movement is a tangible proof of 
how users are keen to build own datasets and be part of the data processing 
cycle, joining state and private entities. In this vein, the need for interopera-
bility (Palfrey/Gasser 2012) and data portability is evident. There seems to be 
a growing interest in data portability in the EU, namely the user’s ability to 
transfer her own data across platforms. This has now been included in article 
15 of the Commission’s revised proposal24, which provides that where personal 
data is processed by electronic means, the user has the right to obtain a copy of 
their personal data in a “commonly used”, “electronic and interoperable” format. 
Although the concept of interoperability in general is associated at large with 
copyright law and perhaps appears loosely linked to data protection, its impor-
tance for human rights in the digital era can be best demonstrated through the 
potential it holds for restoring autonomy in online communications.
This last point, arguing for a user-centric internet, seems to be not only 
supporting an autonomy-based policy model for free speech but for other rights 
as well, such as privacy. There seems to be a growing tendency to exploit the 
internet architecture for allowing the user the right to be in sole control of his 
data shared online, be it speech or personal data. Take for example the concept 
of privacy by design25, namely the adoption of privacy enhancing technologies 
in engineering systems, set out by the Information & Privacy Commissioner of 
Ontario, Canada, Ann Cavoukian26 since the early 1990s. Or consider the latest 
MIT media lab’s venture (cf. De Montjoye et al. 2014) open PDS (Personal Data 
Store): a system that stores data in a repository controlled by the end user, not 
the application developer or service provider.
The three case studies explored in this paper demonstrate further how data 
in itself is thus either a valuable tool or a potential threat to the user’s funda-
mental rights. What is suggested here is a positive rights-based approach to 
maintain a decentralised encrypted networked environment, able to guarantee 
a certain level of autonomy for the user. Instead of focusing narrowly on 
protecting one’s privacy at the expense of informational flow and free expres-
24 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for 
a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free move-
ment of such data. 
25 “Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: The Path to Anonymity”, Information/Pri-
vacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada, and Registratiekammer, The Netherlands, 
August 2, 1995 (https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/anoni-v2.pdf).
26 “Cavoukian’s Seven Foundational Principles of the Concept of Privacy by Design”, 
March 3, 2015 (http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2009/08/7founda 
tionalprinciples.pdf).
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sion, it is imperative to look at the matter in a contextualised positive manner 
towards boosting autonomy through a user-centric networked environment. 
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